Date China takes major military action against Taiwan – By Dec 2036

Reference classes

We use three levels of evidence, from general to specific, combined with partial pooling to estimate a time-varying monthly hazard rate.

Level 1: General territorial dispute base rate

Among all major-power territorial disputes post-1945, roughly 1-2% per year escalate to significant military action. This comes from the Correlates of War MID dataset (~2,400 militarized interstate disputes 1816-2014, 85% of fatal conflicts involving territorial issues). This is the weakest prior — just a sanity floor.

Level 2: Major powers with active military buildup for a specific territorial goal

This is the core reference class. We identified 13 historical cases — 8 that resulted in military action, 5 where no action has been taken despite decades of tension.

Cases that resulted in military action:

Cases where no military action has been taken:

Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of these 13 cases gives roughly 54% probability of action within 10 years of active buildup starting, implying an average annual hazard of ~7.5%/year during the buildup phase. The median time to action among those that acted was ~6 years.

The cases where no action was taken are critical — they show that roughly 40% of these disputes simply never result in full military action, even over many decades. China-Taiwan itself is the longest-running such case at 77 years.

Level 3: China-Taiwan specific expert data

Current prediction markets and expert surveys (as of March 2026) provide the most directly relevant evidence:

• Metaculus: full-scale blockade by 2030 at 40%, by 2035 at 60%; full-scale invasion by 2028 at 10%, by 2030 at ~20%, by 2035 at ~33%
• CSIS 2024 survey: 52% of 64 China experts think force short of invasion “likely” within 10 years; only 27% of US experts and 17% of Taiwan experts believe China can currently execute an amphibious invasion
• Swift Centre: 9% blockade probability by mid-2027
• Pentagon 2025 report: PLA targeting capability to fight and win a Taiwan war by end of 2027; new bridge landing vessels and expanded amphibious training observed

These imply annualised hazard rates of ~12-16%/year near-term (peaking 2027-2028 around the PLA modernisation milestone), declining to ~7%/year long-term.

Multilevel model

The posterior annual hazard rate for each year is a weighted average of Level 2 and Level 3:

λ_pooled(year) = 0.80 × λ_specific(year) + 0.20 × λ_group

• 80% weight on Level 3 (specific): prediction markets aggregate hundreds of forecasters with diverse information — substantially more informative than the small historical sample.
• 20% weight on Level 2 (group): the reference class pull prevents overconfidence and anchors the long-run tail to historical base rates.

Level 1 is absorbed into Level 2 (the Kaplan-Meier already incorporates the non-action cases).

Time variation

The hazard rate is time-varying: it peaks in 2027 (the PLA's stated modernisation deadline, the consensus “window of maximum danger” identified by military analysts) then gradually declines as the specific risk window passes. It remains well above the general base rate throughout the forecast horizon due to the structural nature of the cross-strait dispute. Monthly values are smoothed via linear blending at year boundaries, then converted to a cumulative CDF via the survival function.

Hazard rates and cumulative probabilities by year

Resolution criteria

This market resolves to the earliest date at which any of the following conditions is reported by at least two of AP, Reuters, and AFP: (a) at least 1,000 People's Liberation Army military personnel have been deployed to the main island of Taiwan for the purpose of establishing PRC sovereignty; (b) the People's Republic of China has imposed a blockade that closes all major Taiwanese ports (Kaohsiung, Keelung, Taichung, and Taipei) for at least 10 consecutive days; or (c) the People's Republic of China has launched kinetic strikes (missiles, airstrikes, or naval bombardment) against military or civilian infrastructure on the main island of Taiwan. Exclusions: military exercises that do not actively intercept traffic or strike targets; cyber-only operations; actions limited to outlying islands (Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu) without action against the main island; economic sanctions or trade restrictions without physical military action.

Sources

• Metaculus Q#11480: Chinese invasion of Taiwan forecasts
• Metaculus Q#12309: China blockade of Taiwan forecasts
• Metaculus Q#5320: Chinese control of half of Taiwan by 2050
• Metaculus Q#11401: China controls Taiwan after invasion
• CSIS ChinaPower 2024: expert survey on China's approach to Taiwan
• CSIS ChinaPower 2022: earlier expert survey (64 China experts)
• Swift Centre: China-Taiwan and TSMC risks to 2027
• Pentagon 2025 Report: annual report on PRC military and security developments
• UI Sweden (2024): “Is a conflict over Taiwan drawing near?” — review of available forecasts
• EA Forum (2023): “An invasion of Taiwan is uncomfortably likely”
• Correlates of War: Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (base rates)

Download the Python script used for this analysis