Date China takes major military action against Taiwan – 2034

Reuters reported on October 1 that U.S. officials increasingly see a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 as unlikely, despite Xi Jinping's instruction for the PLA to be ready by 2027. The report cites two current U.S. officials, one former official and one person familiar with the matter, all anonymous. Their reasons: the anti-corruption purge has hurt readiness and left two active members on the seven-seat Central Military Commission; they described last year's exercises as smaller and less threatening; and Beijing wants to see the result of Taiwan's January 2028 election. One official said a fourth straight DPP win would change that: “If that happens, I think 2028 becomes pretty sporty.” The sources discussed invasion only; the report does not assess blockade or strike options. The Pentagon declined to comment. Reuters via Internazionale: U.S. officials see invasion unlikely before 2028

China's revised National Defense Mobilization Law takes effect today, October 1. The NPC Standing Committee adopted it on August 28. Article 2 defines national defense mobilization as state action to meet threats to sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security and development interests by converting economic and social capacity into defense capacity, with rapid shifts between peacetime and wartime. Article 25 requires county-level and higher governments to build mobilization preparation into economic and social development plans, and military authorities to fold implementation plans into combat-readiness planning. Xinhua: full revised law text (Chinese); State Council/Xinhua: NPC Standing Committee adoption, August 28.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense budget proposal sets out a six-year NT$27.59 billion (US$868.16 million) program to raise combat-ammunition stocks from 30 days to 120 days, to sustain operations during a blockade. The ministry allocated NT$7.3 billion after the Executive Yuan approved the program on September 3. A defense-planning director said the program needs to be accelerated because more frequent exercises and drills have depleted ammunition. Taipei Times, September 29

Taiwan’s defense minister Wellington Koo said on September 29 that Taipei had received no notice of a change to existing U.S. arms sales or cooperation. A separate $14 billion package remains stalled after the May Trump–Xi summit; Koo said 66 F-16V jets have reached the production stage for delivery. Associated Press, September 29

Defense Priorities’ September 10 report recommends ending U.S. mutual-defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia and adopting a non-intervention policy for a Taiwan conflict. It proposes moving most U.S. forces from the first island chain toward Guam, Palau and other second-chain locations, with changes completed by 2035. Stars and Stripes reports about 80,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in Japan and South Korea. This remains a think-tank proposal; the 2026 National Defense Strategy calls for a denial defense along the first island chain. Defense Priorities report · Stars and Stripes, September 23

From June 6–10, China’s Ministry of Transport said maritime authorities inspected 198 vessels east of Taiwan. The Diplomat reports that Chinese Coast Guard ships radioed all transiting commercial vessels for origin and destination details, including ships from Singapore, Benin and Liberia. The Diplomat: China is moving toward a new form of coercion at sea.

Kyodo: Beijing threatens to cancel the September 24 summit if Washington approves new Taiwan arms sales.

President promulgates KMT-backed drone bill — NT$240bn over six years in principle; annual appropriations still matter.

China deploys record number of ships around Taiwan as pressure grows — AFP. July’s 244 excludes warships.

Taiwan says ‘unpredictable’ China strengthens air and sea control nearby — Reuters.

I don't think the PLA purges mean much of anything. The PLA has a longstanding modernization program dedicated to producing an army that can take Taiwan if the political leadership decides it needs to. A few sackings/eliminations, even of elite generals, are not going to change the PLA's trajectory nor IMO do they tell us much about how the political leadership perceives PLA readiness: there are a LOT of plausible reasons to purge someone, ranging from genuine corruption and incompetence to political disloyalty to simply wanting/needing to flex party control over the army (something that has not typically been entirely guaranteed in modern China).

More significant IMO are the 2028 Taiwan elections. If the KMT wins and manages to put together enough internal coherence that it is perceived as a credible negotiating partner in Beijing, this IMO lowers the risk of invasion very substantially out to at least 2032. The CCP leadership is relatively risk averse and I think would prefer to settle the Taiwan question through political means rather than war. I think everyone in the West thinks this is impossible (especially after Hong Kong) and maybe it is, but

a) the CCP may well not agree
b) although Hong Kong is perhaps something of a failure as far as the "one China, a few different systems" model goes, Macao is still right there!

The KMT is a broad coalition with pro-US and more open-to-Beijing factions, and has historically struggled to stick to a coherent unified party platform enforced by the party leadership: everything is worked out by negotiation between factions instead. That said, the pro-Beijing faction seems to be in the ascendancy, winning the party chairmanship via Cheng Li-wun, who is currently visiting China and is expected to meet Xi (this is the first trip to China by a senior KMT figure in at least 10 years). The governing DPP is unpopular and widely perceived to be dubiously competent, and only won the last election due to vote-splitting between the KMT and TPP. I do expect the DPP to lose power in 2028, and so most of my risk is concentrated in the period after 2032: if there is no move towards a more pro-China politics on Taiwan by then, and no progress at all towards reunification talks, then invasion risk rises considerably.

Very unlikely in the next couple of years given the extensive purges in the PLA.