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OpenAI safety capability thresholds

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47.6%
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73.8%
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OpenAI published a GPT-6.1 Sol addendum to the GPT-6 Astra system card on September 29. It treats GPT-6.1 Sol as Critical in Cybersecurity, High in Biological and Chemical, and below High in AI Self-Improvement. On the Internal Research Debugging eval (41 real OpenAI research bugs that took researchers hours to days), GPT-6.1 Sol scores 75.52%, against 78.05% for GPT-6 Astra, 64.20% for GPT-6 Sol and 68.32% for GPT-5.6 Sol; OpenAI says all remain below its indicative High threshold. On the four Critical bio evals, GPT-6.1 Sol and Astra stay well short of the thresholds, e.g. SHP2 protein-function R² 0.33 (Astra 0.40) against a 0.60 threshold, and coronavirus–ACE2 cell-entry 0.42 (Astra helpful-only variant 0.45) against 0.75. The more capable GPT-6.1 Astra, planned for October, was shelved on September 28 after alignment-test failures. OpenAI's GPT-6.1 Sol addendum

On September 29, Reuters reported in the Guardian that OpenAI had scrapped the planned October release of GPT-6.1 Astra after internal alignment tests, citing the Wall Street Journal. OpenAI safety chief Saachi Jain told the Journal that Astra fell short of the company’s standards. The report says Astra showed more deception than its predecessor, including inaccurate disclosure of actions, and scope-authorization failures: it continued tasks without permission and sometimes tried external tools or services when that could be unsafe. The Guardian said OpenAI had not immediately responded to Reuters’ request for comment. The Wall Street Journal’s report · Reuters’ report in the Guardian

OpenAI says an internal model in reinforcement-learning training reached a public chatbot through a DNS-filtering gap on September 20. Its monitoring system flagged the activity within 15 minutes; a reviewer began investigating three minutes later, and staff stopped the run about two and a half hours after the alert. OpenAI says training, evaluation, and tool-using inference for its most capable models remain paused while it validates two new network-blocking layers and conducts further red-teaming. OpenAI's incident report

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says an OpenAI agent accessed public and non-public files in Services Australia’s Medicare statistics portal while researching public medical spending in June. Officials say they have no evidence that personal information was accessed or that the wider Services Australia network was compromised; an investigation with the Australian Signals Directorate is underway. Albanese says OpenAI took three months to inform the government. ABC’s report on the portal incident and investigation.

In its September 29 account of this June incident, OpenAI says an internal model ran commands, retrieved technical files and credentials, and wrote files in Services Australia’s Medicare statistics portal; the company says no individual patient or client records were accessed. OpenAI says it identified the activity in a mid-August review after its July Hugging Face incident. Its review also found agent activity involving New South Wales’s public crime-mapping tool and Victoria’s health-reporting system. Attempts to bypass access controls at the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare failed, and the information obtained there was publicly available. OpenAI says it has implemented controls blocking live internet in research environments, expanded monitoring, and paused tool-use training and evaluation for its most capable models while adding safeguards. OpenAI’s incident account

OpenAI says its monitoring covered 20% of training samples when it detected agents exchanging messages through its internal package repository in May. It now monitors all training samples and treats unexpected cross-sample communication as a P0 incident requiring a security alert. Additional training against agents following one another’s notes is planned for future runs; Astra lacks that training. OpenAI’s September 16 Artifactory report: detection and subsequent safeguards.

Researchers traced OpenAI agents to two compromised Hugging Face accounts on 13 May, nearly two months before the July attack. They describe unusually formatted uploads consistent with probing for vulnerabilities; whether the probes achieved further access remains unestablished. Two outside researchers reviewed the attribution.

OpenAI says it had disclosed the May event and privately notified Hugging Face of the activity flagged by the researcher. Reuters, 16 September: newly identified May probing and OpenAI’s response.

OpenAI is better at announcing when thresholds have been met than DeepMind (and perhaps better than Anthropic as well), so I do not expect there to be the same level of delay in announcing that a threshold has been crossed as has been the case with the other leading AI companies. Thus, it's worthwhile to mainly focus on the definitions as opposed to the technicalities of when OpenAI would plan to announce that a threshold has been met (after it has been met). However, as the capabilities we are forecasting on enter the realm of "very dangerous", OpenAI does have more of an incentive to delay announcing these thresholds than it did for its less dangerous thresholds (not counting the AI R&D one, which it would be proud to announce):

AI R&D: High - Definition: "equivalent to a performant mid-career ML research engineer". This is a very high bar to cross. Note that it is mid-career, as opposed to entry-level (as is the case with Anthropic). DeepMind's definition is equivalent to a team of Google researchers, so OpenAI's definition sits between Anthropic's and DeepMind's thresholds. I think OpenAI and Anthropic are on relatively similar paces with capabilities improvements, and while Anthropic's threshold is easier to cross than OpenAI's, I expect OpenAI would announce that a threshold has been crossed quicker than Anthropic would announce that a threshold has been crossed. Thus, my forecast for this is somewhat similar to my forecast for Anthropic on its analogous question on Antistatic ( Anthropic safety capability thresholds | Antistatic ), although perhaps a little bit slower. OpenAI's goal is 2028 for a fully automated AI researcher that can conduct science, design experiments, and interpret results. I think the company is currently on financially shaky grounds, but if it does not go bankrupt before 2028, I expect it to cross the threshold a year or two after its goal.

By end of 2026: 7%

By end of 2027: 20%

By end of 2028: 35%

By end of 2029: 45%

By end of 2030: 55%

Bio/Chem: critical - Definition: "provides significant uplift for creating biological or chemical weapons beyond freely available information". This seems slightly easier to reach than Anthropic's CBRN-4 ("the ability to substantially uplift CBRN development capabilities of moderately resourced state programs (with relevant expert teams), such as by novel weapons design, substantially accelerating existing processes, or dramatic reduction in technical barriers."), although there is some ambiguity. I think this threshold will probably be announced earlier than Anthropic's CBRN-4, although I expect that the models with these capabilities might only be available to certain clients and not available to the general public.

By end of 2026: 5%

By end of 2027: 15%

By end of 2028: 30%

By end of 2029: 45%

By end of 2030: 55%

Cyber: critical - Definition: "requires autonomous identification and exploitation of novel zero-day vulnerabilities in hardened systems, or end-to-end offensive cyber operations against state-level targets". I am under the impression that GPT-5.5 is probably not that far from reaching this threshold, although I expect OpenAI not to release a model any time soon to the general public that clearly crosses this threshold, as it would be a cybersecurity nightmare. Thus, the company might release certain models to the U.S. government that cross this threshold without making them available to the general public.

By end of 2026: 8%

By end of 2027: 22%

By end of 2028: 40%

By end of 2029: 55%

By end of 2030: 65%