Highest US annual real GDP growth
This market has horizons that resolve independently. Each horizon resolves to the highest annual U.S. real GDP growth reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for the relevant calendar years.
Before 2030 covers calendar years 2025–2029. Before 2035 covers calendar years 2025–2034. The latest annual real GDP growth value at market launch was 2.1% for 2025, so thresholds below 3% are omitted.
If BEA or FRED later revises or updates the relevant GDP data, the market may be re-resolved using the updated official data. If GDPC1 is renamed or retired, the most directly comparable BEA real-GDP successor series applies.
2025 grew 2.3% and 2026 is tracking about 2.4%, so a 3% year has to come later. Those later years start from the Fed's September projections, then add forecast error, recession-and-rebound swings and an AI-productivity tail. The 2035 window has twice as many chances for one unusually strong year.
Reference classes
- US years with real GDP growth at or above 3% (published to one decimal), 1948–2025: 40 of 78
- US years with real GDP growth at or above 5%, 1948–2025: 14 of 78
- US years with real GDP growth at or above 6%, 1948–2025: 9 of 78
- Rolling four-year windows reaching at least 5% growth since 1948: 37 of 75
- Rolling nine-year windows reaching at least 5% growth since 1948: 42 of 70
- 2025 annual real GDP growth (current vintage): 2.3%
- 2026 Q1–Q3 real GDP growth, annualised: 2.5%, 2.2%, 3.4%
- Atlanta Fed GDPNow for 2026 Q4, annualised (FRED, 17 November): 3.4%
- Fed September 2026 median real GDP growth, Q4 over Q4: 2.4% in 2027, 2.2% in 2028, 2.1% in 2029, 2.0% longer run
Method
The starting probabilities of this market were calculated by simulating annual GDP growth paths from 2026 through 2034. Each path starts from current official GDP forecasts, samples annual forecast-error variance, allows recession/rebound shocks, and adds a modest-to-fat AI productivity uplift. The model asks a simple question for each threshold: how likely is it that at least one year in the window reaches this growth rate?
These probabilities assume the market can resolve using official U.S. GDP data.
This market has horizons that resolve independently:
Before 2030 - highest annual real GDP growth across calendar years 2025 through 2029. The latest observed anchor is 2025 annual-average growth of about 2.1%, so thresholds below 3% are omitted.
Before 2035 - highest annual real GDP growth across calendar years 2025 through 2034 inclusive.
Reference classes
The main baseline comes from current official forecasts. The March 2026 Federal Reserve Summary of Economic Projections has median real GDP growth of 2.4% in 2026, 2.3% in 2027, 2.1% in 2028, and 2.0% in the longer run; its historical forecast-error bands put roughly 70% of outcomes in a wide range that reaches about 4.5% to 5.2% over the next three years. That anchors the moderate part of the curve but leaves real upside risk. The Fed SEP values are Q4/Q4 growth rates, so they are used as baseline calibration rather than as the exact resolution metric.
Historical FRED GDPC1 data from 1948-2025 give a mean growth rate of 3.14%, with 38 of 78 years at or above 3%, 14 at or above 5%, 9 at or above 6%, and none at or above 10%. Rolling four-year windows reached at least 5% in 49% of post-1948 cases, while rolling nine-year windows reached at least 5% in 60%. The recent economy is lower-trend than the early postwar period, so these historical frequencies are shrunk toward the Fed baseline rather than copied directly.
As a check on the low end, historical years after a start close to 2025's 2.1% have almost always produced at least one later year that beat the starting year. Clearing 3% is less automatic in the lower-growth modern economy, but the combination of ordinary volatility, recession-rebound dynamics, and possible AI/productivity gains argues against leaving too much probability on every future year staying below 3%.
The AI channel can move both GDP and employment. The BLS 2024-2034 projection technical note says faster technological progress would show up as faster productivity growth and therefore higher GDP growth under its full-employment framework. If the productivity gain were broad and uniform, employment need not fall mechanically; if it is uneven across industries, the employment effects are much harder to project. This is why the model gives GDP an upside AI/productivity tail while treating labor-force dislocation separately in the LFPR market.
Why the 2035 distribution sits higher than the 2030 distribution
The 2035 window is twice as long as the 2030 window and has more chances to include one unusually strong year. The same path generator is used for both horizons; the 2035 distribution is higher because it observes more years from each simulated path.
Simulation inputs
Implied reference points
Influential examples
Overlap handling and uncertainty
Recession rebounds, annual volatility, and AI productivity gains are simulated inside the same annual path rather than counted as separate independent reasons to exceed a threshold. The AI tail keeps some probability on very high growth years without treating 10%+ annual real GDP growth as a central outcome.
Source links
Federal Reserve March 2026 Summary of Economic Projections.
FRED GDPC1 real GDP series, sourced from BEA.
BEA fourth-quarter and annual 2025 GDP release.
NBER U.S. business cycle dates.
Refitted on 17 November 2026. v1 left no script, so the simulation was rebuilt from this methodology and the tables above; the settings v1 did not state (error persistence, recession depth and rebound, AI ramp timing) were chosen so the rebuild reproduces v1's published reference points to within about three points. The inputs were then updated: 2025 is 2.3% in BEA's current data (not 2.1%); 2026 is pinned near 2.4% by three published quarters (2.5%, 2.2%, 3.4% annualised) and the Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimate for Q4 (3.4%), with simulated paths weighted to match it; the central path uses the September 2026 Fed projections.
The market resolves on annual-average growth, but the Fed projects Q4-over-Q4 growth. The refit turns the Fed medians into a quarterly path and computes annual averages from it. Strong growth late in 2026 carries over, so 2027's central value is 2.7% on the annual-average measure against 2.4% Q4 over Q4. Simulated values are rounded to one decimal, as BEA publishes them, so 2.96% counts as 3.0%. On published figures 40 of 78 years since 1948 reached 3% (38 on unrounded levels); 2021 is now 6.3%, which leaves the 6% count at 9.
Simulation inputs
| Input | Value | Role in the simulation |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline annual growth | 2.4% in 2026, 2.3% in 2027, about 2.1% afterward | Fed-style central path before shocks and AI uplift |
| Annual forecast-error variance | 1.2 percentage-point standard deviation, with mild persistence | Ordinary upside/downside annual volatility |
| Recession start rate | About one per 8 years | Down year followed by a partial-to-full rebound year |
| AI productivity uplift | Scenario mixture from slow to exceptional AI productivity | Raises measured GDP growth over a sampled ramp period |
| AI productivity scenario | Weight | Full-ramp GDP growth boost mean/sigma (pp) |
|---|---|---|
| Slow AI productivity | 0.35 | 0.3 / 0.25 |
| Moderate AI productivity | 0.35 | 1.0 / 0.45 |
| Fast AI productivity | 0.20 | 2.4 / 0.90 |
| AI boom | 0.08 | 5.0 / 1.90 |
| Exceptional AI boom tail | 0.02 | 10.0 / 4.00 |
Implied reference points
| Threshold | 2030 P(max >= threshold) | 2035 P(max >= threshold) |
|---|---|---|
| 3% | ~82% | ~98% |
| 4% | ~55% | ~85% |
| 5% | ~31% | ~62% |
| 6% | ~18% | ~41% |
| 10% | ~2% | ~6% |
Influential examples
| Year | Real GDP growth | Why it matters | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 8.7% | Postwar and Korean War-era surge; highest in the post-1948 FRED sample. | FRED GDPC1 |
| 1984 | 7.2% | Strong rebound after the early-1980s recession. | NBER cycle dates |
| 1999 | 4.8% | Late-1990s productivity boom; useful modern high-growth analogue. | FRED GDPC1 |
| 2021 | 6.2% | COVID reopening rebound; relevant for rebound mechanics but not a clean normal-growth baseline. | FRED GDPC1 |
| 2025 | 2.3% | Latest annual-average anchor for this market's observed running maximum. | BEA 2025 annual report |
Checked against sources, November 2026. 1 row corrected.
Sources
Liquidity over time
i Shows the market’s available liquidity over time. Liquidity can decay continuously and may change discretely if liquidity adjustments are applied.Comments
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